From financial instability to green finance: the role of banking and credit market regulation in the Eurace model by Raberto, Marco et al.
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
From financial instability to green finance: the role
of banking and credit market regulation in the
Eurace model
Marco Rabertoa,∗ · Bulent Ozelb · Linda
Pontaa · Andrea Tegliob,c · Silvano
Cincottia
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract We investigate appropriate banking and regulatory policies aimed
at pushing the banking sector to shift from speculative lending, cause of asset
bubbles and economic crises, to green investments lending, so to foster the
transition to a more energy efficient production technology. For this purpose,
we consider an enriched version of the Eurace model, which includes heteroge-
nous capital goods, allowing for different degrees of energy efficiency in the
production technology. Credit money in Eurace is endogenous and limited by
Basel capital adequacy regulation on the supply side, while on the demand side
it is determined by firms’ investments and households’ house purchasing. We
introduce a differentiation of capital requirements according to the destination
of lending, demanding higher banks’ capital in the case of speculative lending,
thus encouraging banks to finance firms investments. As up-to-date capital
goods have better energy efficiency in the model design, a higher pace of in-
vestments implies also a positive environmental effect. Results suggest that
the proposed regulation is able to foster investments and capital accumulation
in the short term, improving the energy efficiency of firms. However, reducing
mortgages with a restrictive regulation has a negative impact on total private
credit, and thus on endogenous money supply, weakening consumption and
aggregate demand. In the long term, the contraction of total credit becomes
stronger, and the negative outcomes on aggregate demand also affect invest-
ments. Therefore, in the long run, the positive effects on capital and energy
efficiency become negligible, while the main economic indicators deteriorate.
JEL codes: E51, Q58, C63
Keywords Green finance · Capital requirements · Energy efficiency ·
Agent-based modelling
(a) DIME, University of Genoa, via Opera Pia 15, Genoa, Italy
(b) Department of Economics, University Jaume I, Castellon, Spain
(c) Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy
(*) Corresponding author: marco.raberto@unige.it
2 Short form of author list
1 Introduction
Achieving the goal to limit global temperature increases below 2 deg C with
respect to preindustrial levels, as agreed by 195 countries at the United Na-
tions climate change conference, known as COP21, held in Paris in December
2015, will require enormous investments in the green sectors of the economy.
Strongest efforts shall be devoted in particular to fostering the transition of
energy production from fossil fuels to renewable sources and to the improve-
ment of energy efficiency in buildings, industries and in the transportation
sector.
Year 2015 hits a new record high for global investments in renewable energy
projects that, excluding large hydro-electric projects, amounted to $ 285.9 bil-
lions, whose more than half have been made in the developing world including
China, India and Brazil, see UNEP (2016). However, different studies have
pointed out that the size of investment required each year in low carbon sec-
tors to limit the temperature increase to the target should be much higher, i.e.
in a range from $ 650 billions to $ 1 trillion, see e.g. IEA (2012); WEF (2013).
Therefore, there is a relevant so-called green investment gap that needs to be
covered. This however looks a particular challenging task in the present eco-
nomic environment characterized by low growth in advanced economies and
increasing risks in developing ones. Furthermore, green investments are usu-
ally characterized by high political uncertainty regarding the real long-term
commitment of public policies of support, by long-term time horizon and very
high initial capital costs (Nelson and Shrimali (2014)). These features make
low-carbon investments unattractive to private investors in absence of a strong
and sizeable long-term commitment by the government to some form of public
support.
The most well-known and discussed solution to the low-carbon investment
challenge has been the introduction of a price on carbon (Nordhaus (2013);
WB (2015)), either through a carbon tax, i.e. a tax on the carbon content
of goods and services, or through a cap-and-trade system of emissions al-
lowances, with the aim to address the market failure related to the exclusion
of environmental costs from the market pricing system. The rationale is that
a carbon price would push private agents to correctly internalize environmen-
tal costs and therefore to perform the appropriate green investments aimed
to reduce them. However, carbon price mechanisms still have strong political
opposition1 on the grounds that they are harmful for business and can damp
economic growth.
Beside carbon pricing, a new idea that is gaining attention concerns the design
of appropriate banking regulation policies aimed to push banks to lend to low-
carbon activities so to easy the green investment gap, see e.g. Rozenberg et al.
(2013); Ferron and Morel (2014); Aglietta et al. (2015); Campiglio (2016). A
banking regulatory framework, where banks that lend to firms undertaking
1 See e.g. the repeal of the carbon tax by the new Australian government in 2014 or the
debate in the US 2016 presidential race
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green investments are required to respect looser requirements, could indeed
manage to direct credit towards the green sector and therefore reduce the
green investment gap. In particular, according to Campiglio (2016), differenti-
ating reserve requirements on the base of the green orientation of the financed
investment is the policy most seriously considered. However, the author is also
skeptical about the validity of this policy proposal; in particular in advanced
economies, where reserves are not actually binding, because central banks usu-
ally control the price of reserves (the interest rate) and not the quantity of
reserves, and private banks are never rationed in their reserve demand. This
is the reason why the author lays down a new proposal about differentiating
capital requirements and not reserve requirements, as according to the Basel
regulatory framework. The advantage is that capital ratios are actually binding
in advanced economies. In particular, Campiglio (2016) states: “An analogous
proposal involves setting differentiated capital requirements; that is, imposing
different capital adequacy ratios according to the characteristics of the bank-
ing institute and the type of lending they provide. Capital requirements are
likely to be more effective than liquidity ones in constraining bank lending, as
even creating new central bank reserves would not change the capital ratio,
or at least not in the way banks desire. Therefore, implementing a regula-
tory framework where banks that lend to low-carbon (or other socially useful)
sectors are required to respect looser requirements could fruitfully manage to
direct larger flows of new credit creation towards them. A similar proposal in-
volves calibrating the computation of Basel III risk-weighted capital ratios in
a way that low-carbon activities would exert a lower pressure than alternative
investments.”
To this purpose, the most important contribution of the paper consists in test-
ing this innovative green macro-prudential policy proposal in a computational
environment.
In this paper, we investigate the banking regulatory provision that differenti-
ates the capital adequacy ratio according to the type of lending. In particular,
we employ an agent-based macro-economic model and simulator to study the
effectiveness and the long-run impact on the economy of this type of regula-
tory provision. A number of agent-based macro models2 have been proposed
in recent years to address the known limitations of the traditional DSGE
modelling approach in macroeconomics, see Fagiolo and Roventini (2016) for
a comprehensive review and comparison of the two approaches. Furthermore,
agent-based macro-models are going to be applied also to study climate change
economics and investigate related policies, see e.g. Balint et al. (2017) for a
compressive review and Farmer et al. (2015) for a general discussion about the
potential advantages of agent-based models with respect to integrated assess-
ment models, which are the usual workhorse in the field. In particular, Gerst
2 A non-exhaustive list could include the K+S model, see Dosi et al. (2010, 2013, 2015),
the set of models developed by the Ancona research group (Caiani et al. (2015); Riccetti
et al. (2015); Russo et al. (2016)), the CC-MABM (Assenza et al. (2015)), the Mark I CRISIS
model (Klimek et al. (2015); Gualdi et al. (2015)), Iceace (Erlingsson et al. (2014)), Eurace
(Cincotti et al. (2012a)) and Eurace@UNIBI (Dawid et al. (2016))
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et al. (2013) and Tonelli et al. (2016) are among the first attempts to address
sustainability issues by means of the agent-based approach. The flow-of-fund
dynamic Eirin model (Monasterolo and Raberto (2018)), where agents are
identified with the different sectors of the economy, can be considered among
the first pioneering attempts in the same direction.
In this respect, we claim that the agent-based modelling approach is particu-
larly suited to encompass the relevant features needed to address our research
question, such as the endogenous nature of money created by the banking sys-
tem in modern economies, see e.g. McLeay et al. (2014); Werner (2014), and
the non-equilibrium evolutionary dynamics of the economy (Kaldor (1972);
Arthur (2006)).
For the purposes of our study, we employ the agent-based macroeconomic
model and simulator Eurace, in particular the most recent version including
housing assets, a related market and mortgage lending, see Ozel et al. (2016),
that we further enrich with two relevant new features to address the research
question of the paper.
The first feature regards a new design of banking regulation that follows a
proposal by Campiglio (2016), which suggests the adoption of different capital
adequacy ratios according to the type of lending that banking institutions pro-
vide. Accordingly, we have designed a set of computational experiments char-
acterized by capital requirements for mortgages that can be higher or lower
than a reference value, i.e. 10 %, which is the basic capital requirement value
adopted for firms’ loans. The rationale behind this choice is the assumption
that loosening credit access for house purchases may produce asset bubbles
with destabilizing effects for the real economy, while loans to business firms
are aimed to increase and renew their capital endowment with positive effects
for the productive capacity of the economy and for environmental sustainabil-
ity.
It is worth noting that our working hypothesis is not strictly a behavioural
assumption about the attitude of the different types of borrowers (households
or firms) on the use of the borrowed funds for speculation (households) or
for productive investments (firms). Indeed, house purchase decision making
by households is not driven by any speculative purpose but it is mostly ran-
dom (Ozel et al., 2016). Actually, we are not interested here in households’
behavior, but we are more interested in the macroeconomic and credit aspects
of the housing market, and in particular in the impact of mortgage loans on
the economy as a whole. We do not intend to mimic households’ behavior in
the housing market but we want to include this market as an important des-
tination of credit in the economy. Therefore, our main research questions is
about the effects of loose credit conditions, depending on the destination of
the borrowed funds. In this respect, we should consider that over-lending to
the business sector has downside risks due to increasing insolvency rates for
firms but also positive effects on productive capacity and energy efficiency (in
our model) of the economy. On the contrary, easy mortgage lending gives rise
to price bubbles and incentivizes speculative house purchase.
Both theoretical and empirical studies support our assumption. The relevance
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of credit dynamics for business cycles is central in the Minskys financial insta-
bility hypothesis (Minsky, 1986) and has been also pointed out by theoretical
models within the neoclassical school, see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Furthermore, more recently, a large number
of explanations proposed about the financial crisis highlight the credit boom
occurred in the mid 2000s, in particular in relation to mortgage lending prac-
tices and the related housing bubble (see e.g. Keen et al. (2009); Turner (2013);
Muellbauer (2015), along with the ensuing subprime crisis that is considered
the triggering cause of the 2007/2008 financial crisis (Duca et al., 2010). In this
respect, extensive empirical research shows the connection between credit and
housing bubbles and bursts, see e.g. Baker (2008) for US, Xiao and Devaney
(2016) for UK and Ruiz et al. (2015) for Spain.
Finally, the second relevant feature of our model design regards the hetero-
geneity of capital goods with respect to energy efficiency3 that we assume
exogenously increasing over time. This new model provision implies that in-
vestments in capital goods provide also an environmental benefit as the new
vintages are characterized by higher energy efficiency and then allow the pro-
duction of consumption goods at a lower energy intensity per unit of con-
sumption good produced. Investment decision making is then also updated
accordingly to take into account the intertemporal saving of energy per unit
of consumption goods produced due to investment decision.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the agent-based macroe-
conomic model we have employed and Section 3 presents the computational
experiments performed and discusses the relevant results. Concluding remarks
are drawn in section 4.
2 The enriched Eurace model
2.1 Model overview
Eurace is an agent-based macroeconomic model and simulator that has been
developed in the last ten years within two EU-funded projects4, see Cincotti
et al. (2010, 2012a,b); Raberto et al. (2012); Teglio et al. (2012); Raberto
et al. (2014); Teglio et al. (2017); Ponta et al. (2018). The baseline Eurace
model includes different types of agents: households (HHs), which act as work-
ers, consumers and financial investors; consumption goods producers (CGPs),
henceforth firms, producing a homogenous consumption goods; a capital goods
producer (KGP); commercial banks (Bs) and two policy makers agents, namely
a government (G) and a central bank (CB), which are in charge of fiscal and
monetary policy, respectively.
3 It is worth noting the relevance of energy efficiency in the EU environmental policy
framework where a 20 % increase in energy efficiency by 2020 with respect to 1990 is among
the three well-known 20-20-20 targets set by the European Union in 2009, see:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32009D0406
4 FP6 European Project EURACE and EU-FP7 project SYMPHONY
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Agents’ behavior is modelled as myopic and characterized by limited in-
formation, scarce computational capabilities and adaptive expectations. The
details about agents’ decision making in the baseline Eurace model are de-
scribed in Teglio et al. (2017). Agents interact through different markets where
consumption and capital goods, labor and credit are exchanged in a decentral-
ized setting with disperse prices set by suppliers and based on costs. Moreover,
households interact in the housing market. The housing market is characterized
by households that sell or buy homogeneous houses units subject to budget
constraints. If a prospective buyer needs a mortgage, she/he can send a request
to a bank, which provides the mortgage only if the expected future income of
the potential buyer is deemed sufficient to face scheduled mortgage payments
and the bank itself satisfies Basel capital requirements conditions. Households
can assume the role of buyer or seller in the housing market with an equal
exogenous probability. The reason of this random selection is that we are in-
terested on the macroeconomic and credit implications of the housing market,
and in particular on the impact of mortgage loans on the economy as a whole.
However, we allow also for a special case, called fire sale case, where house-
holds enter the housing market because financially distressed (when mortgages
payments have exceeded a given fraction of their income) and are forced to
sell their houses at a discounted price in order to reduce mortgage payments
and debt burden. Trading in the housing market is decentralized, prices are
posted by sellers while prospective buyers are randomly queued to choose the
available housing unit at the lowest price.
The full details about the housing market in Eurace as well as the different
conditions for mortgages lending and their effects on the housing price and
the economy can be found in Ozel et al. (2016). Appendix A1 of this paper
reports the most relevant features of the housing market in Eurace.
In order to investigate the appropriate banking and regulatory policies
aimed to force the banking sector to move away from speculative lending,
cause of asset bubbles and economic crises, to the financing of the green sec-
tor, an enriched Eurace model has been designed. The new model includes an
energy sector, where electricity production is based on fossil fuels. In particu-
lar, electricity is an additional production factor used by consumption goods
producers, which use heterogeneous capital goods characterized by endogenous
electricity efficiency. Finally, we designed banks’ capital requirements which
can vary according to the type of lending, i.e. loans to business firms or mort-
gages to households.
Consumption goods producers (CGPs) need electricity, in addition of labor
and capital, as a production input. The electricity efficiency of the production
process is not constant but depends on the composition of the capital goods
vintages in the capital endowment of every firm (CGP). The lower the average
age of capital goods of a firm, the higher the energy efficiency of production,
or equivalently, the lower the energy intensity of production, i.e. the amount
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of electricty/energy5 required per unit of output.
Banks’ capital adequacy ratios have been differentiated with respect to the
type of lending, namely loans to business firms or mortgages to households for
house purchases.
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the model’s structure, where
the novel features are highlighted with respect to the previous versions. In
particular, rectangles represent the different type of agents and the arrows the
relations among them in terms of current account monetary flows. The new
features are highlighted in bold and yellow and consist in the energy sector
schematised by the power producer and the foreign economy.
The following two subsections will provide the modelling details about the
use of energy sector and the energy efficiency of the production sector as well
as about the differentiation of banks’ capital requirements.
2.2 The energy sector and energy efficiency
We assume that to produce the amount qCf of consumption goods, firm f needs
an appropriate number of employees and an appropriate capital endowment,
as fixed by the Cobb-Douglas technology, see (Teglio et al., 2017, Appendix,
Eq. 8). In this new setting the firms also needs an amount of energy, say qE ,
determined by the equation:
qE = ϵf qCf ,
where ϵf is a firm-specific energy intensity variable that gives the energy
amount required per unit of output. We assume no substitutability between
energy and the other two inputs, i.e. labor and capital. CGPs are never ra-
tioned in their energy demand which is immediately delivered by the power
producer agent6 on request at a price pE which is determined by a fixed mark-
up µE on the price of fossil fuels, pO. The price of fossil fuels is exogenously
given and assumed to be subject to an exponentially monthly growth rate ξO.
Energy costs pEqE are a variable cost that is taken into account by the firm
in addition to labor costs, interest rates and capital depreciation in the deter-
mination of unit costs of output, see (Teglio et al., 2017, Appendix, Eq. 10).
Thus energy costs have also an impact on consumption goods prices.
Energy intensity ϵf is determined by the different vintages of capital goods
owned by firm f . We assume that each unit of capital goods, when employed
in the production process by the firm, requires an amount of energy per unit of
output, i.e. an energy intensity ϵK , that depends on the time the capital good
5 In the paper, we will use the terms electricity and energy interchangeably, with no
distinction.
6 The power producer (PP) agent is a very stylized agent that imports fossil fuels from
the foreign sector at price pO and produces electricity on request with no labor force needed.
PP profits are given by the aggregate amount of energy consumed by the production sector,
multiplied by difference between between pE and pO. PP profits are paid out to shareholders
(households) in the Eurace economy.
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has been manufactured by the capital goods producer (KGP) and delivered to
the firm (CGP). In particular, we assume that, due to technological progress7,
the capital goods producer is able to manufacture capital goods character-
ized by an energy intensity ϵK which decreases exponentially over time at the
monthly rate ξK .
The energy intensity of each firm then decreases over time according to the
size and timing of its investment decisions. When a firm f makes an invest-
ment ∆Kf , its energy intensity decreases according to the weighted average:
ϵf =
ϵ̂f Kf + ϵK ∆Kf
Kf +∆Kf
, (1)
where ϵ̂f was the electricity intensity characterizing the production process of
the firm before the investment, while ϵK is the electricity intensity of the new
vintages of capital goods ∆Kf .
As ϵK is supposed to decrease exponentially over time due to an exoge-
nously given technological progress, firm specific electricity intensity ϵf im-
proves over time due to new investments; therefore, investment decision mak-
ing, based on net present value calculations, needs to take into account not
only the additional positive cash flows from sales due to the higher productive
capacity, as stated in (Teglio et al., 2017, Appendix, Eq. 3), but also the neg-
ative cash flow related to the energy expenses due to the additional output,
as well as the positive cash flows given by the savings of energy expenses per
unit of output because of the lower average ϵf . In particular, firm f chooses
the investment ∆Kf that maximizes a net present value NPV given by three
terms as follows:
NPV = NPV old + PV (1) + PV (2) , (2)
where NPV old takes into account the present value of additional future rev-
enues, due to the expanded production capacity, net of the present cost of
capital, as showed in (Teglio et al., 2017, Appendix, Eq. 3), whereas PV (1)
and PV (2) are given by the following equations:
















where rKf is the yearly weighted average cost of capital for firm f , ∆mqCf is
the additional output8 at future month m given by the planned investment,
7 This assumption is supported by empirical evidence. In particular, the latest Energy
Efficiency Market Report by the International Energy Agency points out that global en-
ergy intensity improved by 1.8 % in 2015 and by 1.5 % in 2014, while the average yearly
improvement was around 0.6 % in the decade between 2003 and 2013 (IEA (2016)).
8 It is worth noting that the additional output is assumed to be a decreasing function of
m to take into account the investments depreciation, see (Teglio et al., 2017, Appendix, Eq.
5).
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∆ϵf is the decrease in energy intensity due to investments and qCf is the
previous production level. Therefore, equations (3) and (4) assess the present
value of additional expected cash flows related to energy expenses, following
the investment in new capital goods. In particular, the additional production
amount ∆mqCf at month m, due to investment, entails an additional energy
cost of amount pE ϵf ∆mqCf , where pE is the expected energy price and ϵf is
the present energy intensity (after investment). Equation (3) computes PV (1),
i.e. the present value of negative cash flows following these higher energy ex-
penses due to the output increase. Furthermore, the investment in new cap-
ital goods provide an increase in energy efficiency and a consequent energy
intensity decrease ∆ϵf that entails positive
9 monthly cash flows of amount
pE ∆ϵf qCf due to the saving of energy costs, Equation (4) computes PV
(2),
i.e. the present value of these positive cash flows related to the energy savings
following the reduced energy intensity value ϵf applied to the previous output
level qCf .
2.3 Differentiation of banks’ capital requirements
Following the provisions of the Basel capital regulations, bank agents in Eurace
are characterized by minimum capital requirements, i.e. by a minimum ratio
between equity (net worth) and risk-weighted assets that each bank must
satisfy. The rationale for capital requirements is to provide a minimum capital
buffer that should be employed to cushion loans or mortgages write-offs and
consequent equity losses so to reduce the likelihood of incurring in negative
equity and insolvent banks. In particular, in the Eurace model, we state that
a bank b, when receiving a new loan request from a firm or a new mortgage
request from a household, it is allowed to fulfill the request only if its equity
base Eb is higher than a fraction Ψ of its risk-weighted portfolio of loans and









where Ψ is the capital adequacy ratio, i.e. a policy parameter ranging from 0
to 1, set by the regulatory authority, ωi is the risk weight of any existing asset
ai (loan or mortgage) of the bank, and a
∗ is the new prospective asset (loan
or mortgage) with its risk weight ωa∗ .
A lower capital adequacy ratio Ψ implies a looser credit regulation policy
and a higher likelihood of boom and bust credit cycles with direct effects on
the economy. The role of capital requirements for the determination of credit
supply and the boom and bust cycles in the Eurace model has been thought-
fully explored, see Cincotti et al. (2012b); Raberto et al. (2012); Teglio et al.
(2012). In particular, we performed different computational experiments by
9 ∆ϵf shall be considered in absolute terms.
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varying the leverage α of the banking system, defined as the inverse of the
capital adequacy ratio, i.e. α = 1/Ψ , in a setting where credit is characterized
by loans to firms only. Our experiments showed that, while loose capital re-
quirements (relatively low ψ, i.e. high α) may induce a credit-driven boom in
the short run, the over-levered firms may face at some point10 in the future
the impossibility to sustain the increasing interest payments with consequent
default cascades which are furtherly amplified by the ensuing rationing of bank
credit, see Raberto et al. (2012); Teglio et al. (2012). Furthermore, we also ex-
plored the potential benefits of a macroprudential approach to banks’ capital
regulation that would allow varying capital requirements depending on some
measures of the business cycle, such as the unemployment, the credit to GDP
ratio or the credit growth rate, see Cincotti et al. (2012b).
In the present study, we differentiate the capital adequacy ratio according
to the type of credit provided, i.e. loan or mortgage. In particular, if the request
received by bank b is for a new loan ℓ̂f by firm f , we stipulate that the bank




ωiai + ωℓ̂f ℓ̂f
)
, (6)
whereas in the case there is a request for a mortgage µ̂h made by household









i ωiai in both Eq. 6 and 7 is the usual risk weighted portfolio of
existing loans and mortgages of the bank and in principle ΨL ̸= ΨM .
In Eq. 6 and 7 we propose a banking regulation that works with two thresholds,
depending on the nature of the loan. If ΨM is higher than ΨL, mortgage loans
require a capital adequacy ratio higher than the one required for loans to firms.
Therefore, a bank could be in the situation of fulfilling the capital requirements
for firms loans but not for mortgages. In particular, when the amount of risky
assets of a bank becomes high, thus raising banks leverage, loans are preferred
to mortgages and the proposed banking regulation becomes effective.
10 This could be considered what is usually known as Minsky moment, see Minsky (1986).
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3 Computational experiments
A number of computational experiments has been performed in a simulation
setting characterized by 3,000 households, 50 consumption goods producers,
3 banks, 1 capital goods producer, 1 power producer, 1 government, and 1
central bank. Table 1 reports the values of the parameters characterizing the
housing and the energy sectors. The whole set of parameter values of the model
is available in Teglio et al. (2017).
The aim of computational experiments is to assess the impact of differ-
entiating banks’ capital requirements based on the type of credit provided,
i.e. between mortgages to households for house purchase and loans to firms
for productive investments. The rationale behind this choice is the assump-
tion that house purchases are made mostly for speculative purposes and may
produce asset bubbles with destabilizing effects, while loans to business firms
are aimed to increase their capital endowment with long-run positive effects
for the productive capacity of the economy. Banking regulation should then
favour lending to business firms with respect to lending for house purchases,
e.g. through setting lower capital requirement in the former case. A similar
proposal has been set out by Campiglio (2016) to spur green investments, at
the expenses of speculative ones, as an alternative to carbon taxation.
To investigate the issue, we have designed a set of computational experi-
ments characterized by capital requirements for mortgages that can be higher
or lower than a reference value, i.e. 10 %, which is the basic capital require-
ment value adopted for business loans. In our model design, investments in
capital goods provide also an environmental benefit as the new vintages are
characterized by higher energy efficiency.
In the following, we use the maximum leverage allowed to banks, henceforth
α, i.e. the inverse of the capital requirement ratio Ψ , to parameterize the
computational experiments, as it is more intuitive. In particular, the value of
α is set to 10 (the inverse of 10 %) for all types of loans during the first year
of any simulation, while since the second year α is differentiated into a αL for
business loans and a αM for mortgages. The maximum allowed leverage αL
is then kept at 10 for loans to firms, whereas in the case of mortgages αM is
changed to a lower or higher value in the range from 0 to 20 and the new value
is maintained for the rest of the simulation. The values assumed by αM are
(0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 20). It is worth noting that the grid for αM
is not equally spaced from 0 to 20 but is more dense around αM = 8, where
indeed we observe the most interesting behavior of the observed economic
variables. Furthermore, it should be considered that zero is quite an extreme
value that αM can assume, as it means that no more mortgages are granted.
For any value of αM considered, 50 different simulations have been performed
depending on the seed of the pseudorandom number generator. Figures from 2
to 11 show the distribution of some relevant economic variables for any value of
αM considered. In particular, the distributions are represented as boxes which
include all the values from the 25th to the 75th percentile and with horizontal
segments and diamond markers which represent the median and the mean of
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the distribution, respectively. Box-plots also include whiskers extending to the
most extreme data points not considered outliers, while outliers are plotted
individually.
For every seed (simulation), we consider the time average over two given
time periods in order to differentiate a short run and a long run. In this
respect, the box-plot figures can be organized into two different groups, where
the first group, from Fig. 2 to Fig. 6, reports the time averages from year
2 to year 6 included, i.e. the first 5 years after the differentiation of capital
requirements, while the second group, from Fig. 7 to Fig. 11, presents the
time averages over the following ten years, i.e. from year 7 to year 16. The
first simulation year has not been considered in the computation of the time
averages because in this period αM is not yet differentiated but set to 10 in
all cases. To conclude, results have been divided into two periods that can be
considered as a short/medium run period for the first 5 years and a long-run
period for the following 10 years.
The first time window has been set to five years because this is the time
span where the effects of the change of αM are observed to be more relevant
and statistically significant on productive investments. In particular, in the
panel (a) of Figure 2 we can observe that both the average and the median
values of the loans distribution have clearly higher values when αM is lower
than 8. We employ the Wilcoxon rank sum test to verify the null hypothesis
that the data reported for different values of αM are taken from distributions
with equal medians. If we assume the null hypothesis that the distributions of
loans for αM = (0, 3, 4) have the same medians of the distributions for αM ≥ 6,
this is rejected at the significance level of 5 %. Therefore a regulatory action
that decreases substantially the maximum allowed leverage (or, equivalently,
increases the capital requirements) for speculative investments, here proxied
by mortgage debt for house purchase, is effective in diverting credit from spec-
ulative to productive investments, at least in the short run (first 5 years). This
is also evident when we observe investments and the aggregate capital stock
of the economy, panel (b) and (d) of Figure 2, as well as the average energy
intensity ϵ, i.e., the amount of required energy for unit of output, panel (c) of
the same Figure. The higher pace of investments for low αM , because of more
credit available, implies newer vintages for firms’ capital goods and therefore
lower energy intensity on average for the aggregate capital endowment. Panel
(b) of Figure 2 shows that the medians of the distribution of the aggregate
capital stock in the economy are clearly higher for values of αM lower than
9. In particular, we observe a downward transition of the accumulated capital
stock from αM = 4 to αM = 9. According to the Wilcoxon rank sum test,
the difference is statistically significant at the significance level of 1 %. Consis-
tently, we get a lower average energy intensity for lower αM , see panel (c) of
Figure 2. Also in this case, the difference is statistically significant. It is worth
noting that the differences in the main variables of figure 2 are statistically
significant in the range of αM from 4 to 9, confirming that this is a quite
critical transition interval.
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Figure 3 presents the main results related to the housing market. In par-
ticular, we can observe that, as expected, the aggregate amount of mortgages
(panel a) is very sensitive to the value of αM as well as the average housing
price (panel b). The looser the banking regulation for mortgages, the higher is
the average housing price, therefore increasing the likelihood of credit-driven
housing market bubbles and raising the instability of the housing market. In
particular, the increase in the average numbers of fire sales in the housing mar-
ket, as pointed out by panel (c) of Fig. 3, is due to the growing difficulty faced
by some households to make mortgage payments. This increases the proba-
bility of housing bubble bursts, with possible destabilizing effects on the real
economy though the lending channel. Ozel et al. (2016) present a detailed dis-
cussion about the effects of credit regulation on the housing market dynamics
in Eurace and the possible destabilizing effects of housing bubble busts on the
real economy.
Figure 4 presents the effects of the differentiated loan versus mortgage
requirements on the real economy. While the medians of the distribution of
unemployment rates (panel b) do not exhibit both graphically and statisti-
cally significant differences for different values of αM , we can clearly observe
from panel (c) that GDP growth rates are significantly higher for αM ≥ 8.
For lower values of αM , we have observed already higher investment rates,
as pointed out by higher levels of loans and capital accumulation showed by
panel (a) and (b) of Fig. 2, respectively. The difference in GDP growth rates
can be only explained by a even higher difference in the consumption growth
rates that should offset the contribution to GDP by higher investment rate at
low αM . This is actually what we observe in panel (d) of figure 4. Therefore,
the increase of investments rates is realized at the expense of consumption
growth rates; but while on the one hand the combined effect looks neutral
for unemployment, on the other hand it is not neutral for GDP growth rates,
pointing out an important drawback of increasing capital requirements for
mortgages. We argue that the explanation of this finding is twofold and con-
cerns both supply and demand side aspects. On the supply side, we understand
that fostering investments requires additional labor force employed at the cap-
ital goods producer; however, due the internal dynamics of the economy, the
overall net result is not a reduction of unemployment but a sort of crowding
out effect that diverts the labor force from the consumption goods sector to
the capital goods one, see in particular panel (a) and (b) of Fig. 6. On the
demand side, we observe that the reduction of mortgages at low αM is not
fully compensated by the increase of loans, as the total aggregate credit in
the economy, i.e. the sum of mortgages and loans, reported by panel (a) of
Fig. 4, exhibits a strong increase for high values of αM similar to the one of
mortgages. Our previous studies, see e.g. Raberto et al. (2012); Teglio et al.
(2012); Cincotti et al. (2012b), have shown how the level of credit in the econ-
omy, i.e. the level of credit money endogenously generated by the banking
system, positively affects economic growth, at least in the short term. This
happens through the supply side channel, i.e. the availability of resources to
firms for investments, as well as through the demand channel, via the higher
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capital income of households, as shareholders of highly profitable banks, and
via the higher general money supply which automatically translates to higher
nominal demand. Furthermore, both our recent work (Ozel et al. (2016)) and
empirical evidence ((ECB, 2013, pag. 21, Chart D)) point out that mortgages
seem positively cross-correlated with economic activity and, differently from
loans, seem to lead the business cycle.
Figure 5 shows the effects of the policy on prices, i.e., the consumption
and the capital goods price level, the nominal wage and the central bank
policy rate. The main result is that, while the distribution of capital goods
prices is both graphically and statistically independent on the value αM , see
panel (b), both consumption goods prices (panel a) and nominal wages (panel
c) depend on it, yet in an opposite way. It si worth noting that the level of
nominal wages in the model depends on the labor market status; in particular,
when unemployment is low, firms may face labor shortage and then compete
to attract workers by rising their wage offer, see Dawid et al. (2014); Teglio
et al. (2017) for more details on the Eurace labor market. The distribution of
unemployment rates looks scarcely dependent on αM , see panel (a) of Fig. 4;
however, the median values of nominal wage does depend on αM , see panel
(c) of Fig. 5. This evidence can be explained considering that the higher αM ,
the tighter is the labor market competition among CGPs, as shown by the
employement rate in the consumption good sector, see panel (a) of Fig. 6; on
the other hand, at low αM the competitive effort to attract workers mainly
regards the capital good sector, which is characterized by just one single player,
differently from the consumption goods sector, where many agents operate.
Interestingly, higher labor costs do not translate into higher consumption
goods prices. Indeed, CGPs apply mark-up pricing where unit costs are given
by labor costs, energy cost and debt service cost, where the first two costs are
variable costs and the latter one is a fixed cost, see Teglio et al. (2017) for more
details on the Eurace mark-up pricing. Therefore, higher consumption goods
prices are clearly explained by the interests cost of the higher debt burden
which CGPs are subject to at lower αM (see panel (a) of figure 2). Higher
consumption goods prices combined with lower nominal wages have of course
a depressing effect on real wages, as also reported on panel (c) of Fig. 6, thus
pointing out another negative consequence of a policy aimed at increasing
capital requirements limited to mortgages.
To summarize our findings so far, the strategy of increasing capital re-
quirements for mortgages has proven to be successful in fostering investments
and capital accumulation in the short term (five years), and consequently in
improving energy efficiency (reducing energy for unit of output) of firms be-
cause of the newer vintages of capital goods available. However, these results
are achieved at some welfare costs for households which can be summarized
in lower consumption growth rates and purchasing power.
The next part of the paper examines if these results are confirmed also in
the long run, i.e., in the following 10 years. Figures 7-11 present the distribu-
tions as box-plots of the same economic variables presented in figures 2-6, yet
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in a different time period, i.e. from year 7 to year 16, instead of from year 2 to
year 6. Figure 7 shows that while the distribution of energy intensity (panel a)
still exhibits both a graphically and statistically significant pattern for differ-
ent values of αM , the distribution of loans, capital stock and investments, are
less affected in the long run than in the short run. This means that, during
the 10 years period, some counterbalancing force in the economic system is
seriously weakening the effects of a regulation which is de facto reducing total
mortgage loans (as shown in figure 8). We think that this counterbalancing
effect is mainly due to the lower amount of total credit in the economy which
in turn reduces the level of endogenous money. In the long run, when αM is
decreased in order to limit mortgages, the economy suffers from the demand
side. Consumption growth is critically reduced and consumption goods pro-
ducers have therefore to scale down production and employment. We see that
the unemployment rate is increasing in the long run from an average of 2% to
an average close to 8% when mortgages are hindered. In the first five years,
the aggregate credit for low αM values is reduced by a 30% with respect to
high αM values, while in the next ten years the difference grows to 66%, show-
ing that the loss in mortgages and endogenous money accumulates during the
years undermining aggregated demand (see Ozel et al. (2016) for further de-
tails). Actually, consumption growth rates suffer a 50% loss in the long run
when αM is low, against a 33% loss in the short run. It is also worth noting
that investment decision-making by firms is based on net present value cal-
culations, where expected demand play a crucial role (see Teglio et al. (2017)
for further details). This explains to some extent why total loans depend on
consumption, and why we do not observe a significant increase of loans when
a mortgage-restricting policy is adopted.
Thus, our simulations show that in the long run the effects of a mortgage-
restricting policy are mainly negative. For very low values of αM the policy is
basically freezing the housing market (see the patterns related to the level of
mortgages and the housing price in Fig. 8) with negative outcomes for the real
economy, as shown in Fig. 9. For higher values of αM the mortgage markets
re-activates, showing of course more instability, characterized by increasing
fire sales. In the long term the advantage for lower leverages in term of capital
stock accumulation during the short term is no more valid. It still exists an
advantage in term of energy efficiency, with an environmental benefit related
to energy consumption, however at the price of an increasing welfare costs,
which in the long term does not concern only purchasing power and consump-
tion rates but also unemployment rates.
Finally, we performed a robustness check allowing for different fossil fuel
price trends. In particular, we considered a constant price trend (ξO = 0) and
a negative monthly exponential growth ξO = −0.5% (downward trend), which
are compared with the monthly price growth rate ξO = 0.5% (upward trend)
that has been used to obtain the previous results.
It is worth noting that the 0.5% monthly growth rate, i.e. an annual growth
rate more than 6%, encompasses the wide range of forecasts about the oil price
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made by relevant international institutions. In particular, the U.S. Energy In-
formation Administration11 (EIA) long-term forecasts set the oil price annual
growth rate at 3% in real term and at 5.1% in nominal term from now to
2050. On the contrary, previsions by the World Bank12 up to 2030 are much
more conservative and characterized by an annual growth rate of only 2.1% in
nominal term and then by a substantial stability if the oil price is measured in
constant US dollars. Finally, the IMF projections13, limited to 2018, point out
that the oil price for the year to come should remain stable also in nominal
term around 50 USD per barrel. These forecasts are very different from each
other, even in the long term, thus highlighting the intrinsic difficulty in cor-
rectly predicting future oil price fluctuations, see e.g. Baumeister and Kilian
(2016). We therefore think that it would not particularly meaningful to stick
to a particular forecast and then to calibrate the system to its value. Actually,
agent-based macro-models are fruitfully employed as computational labora-
tories where to perform what-if analysis about how the economy is affected
by a particular hypothesis (e.g. on the annual growth rate of oil price) and
how some economic policy will work under the same hypothesis, without any
strong claim that this hypothesis will be the one observed in the real world.
According with this perspective we have considered the highest value, among
the official forecasts examined, for the growth rate of oil price and we have then
performed additional computational experiments considering both a constant
price and a decreasing trend for fossil fuels. The main outcomes, collected in
figures 12 and 13, show that all the essential results of the paper are confirmed,
and that the impact of the “green capital requirements differentiation” policy
does not depend on the price trend of fossil fuel. The box-plot have been orga-
nized in two figures. Figure 12 reports the time averages from year 2 to year 6
included, i.e. the first 5 years after the differentiation of capital requirements,
while figure 13 presents the time averages over the following ten years, i.e.
from year 7 to year 16.
Figure 12 clearly shows how inflation of fossil fuel price affects directly
the level of consumption goods prices. In turn, the level of prices affects all
the nominal values of the economic indicators. For example, we note that the
amount of nominal loans raises with the price. We can also note that loans are
increasing with “green incentives” (low αM ) in the three considered cases. The
same holds for the accumulation of firms’ capital stock, which is always higher
when “green incentives” are stronger. Therefore, the main result on the energy
intensity is also confirmed. The higher capital stock level (the plot represents
real units of capital stock) for higher fossil fuel prices can be explained by
two main arguments. From the supply side, “green incentives” favor loans to
enterprises over mortgages, as previously discussed, decreasing firms’ chance to
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out investments successfully. From the demand side, the higher inflation in
consumption price, driven by fossil fuel price inflation, increases the expected
nominal profits and leads to a higher demand for capital goods and loans.
The other main results of the paper are also confirmed. For instance we see
in figure 12 an employment shift from consumption goods producers to capital
goods producers when αM decreases. This result is due to the higher activity
of the KGP, and is not altered by different price trends.
Concerning the long run outcomes of the simulations, what has been ob-
served in the paper is still valid. The housing market freezing for low αM ,
causes a credit contraction that finally affects employment and economic ac-
tivity. In figure 13 both the credit contraction and the higher unemployment
rate are visible.
4 Concluding remarks
Inspired by some recent proposals, aiming at promoting green investments at
the expenses of speculative ones, we designed a set of computational experi-
ments within the agent-based model Eurace. We devised a simple regulation
for banks in order to incentivize loans to firms with respect to real estate
mortgage lending. The regulation consists in demanding higher capital re-
quirements for banks in the case of mortgages, thus encouraging banks to give
loans to firms. As up-to-date capital goods have better energy efficiency in the
model design, a higher pace of investments implies also lower energy intensity
per unit of produced consumption goods, then energy savings and a positive
environmental externality. Simulations outcomes suggest that the regulation
is successful in promoting investments and capital accumulation in the short
term, and consequently in improving energy efficiency of firms. However, these
results are achieved at some welfare costs for households which can be sum-
marized in lower consumption growth rates and purchasing power. The reason
is that reducing mortgages with a restrictive regulation has a negative impact
on the total private credit in the economy, and therefore on the endogenous
money supply. This, in turn, reduces consumption and aggregate demand.
In the long term, the contraction of total credit increases, and the nega-
tive outcomes on aggregate demand become more serious, reducing also firms
investments. Therefore, in the long run, the positive effects on capital and
energy efficiency become negligible, while the main economic indicators show
a period of recession.
Furthermore, in line with previous experiments, our model shows the im-
portant role of endogenous money in the economy. Mortgages and loans repre-
sent the crucial way to channel money to households, and if they are hindered
all the economy suffers, reaching higher unemployment rates. Besides, the
model has also shown that a loose regulation of mortgages can lead to insta-
bility in the housing market with negative repercussion on the real economy.
This means that a fine tuned regulation, that keeps into account the business
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cycle dynamics is probably needed. Our next step will be to implement this
fine tuning, considering macro-prudential rules, or more sophisticated regula-
tions with the goal to foster green investments on the one hand, and to provide
enough credit to sustain the performance of the economy on the other hand.
Furthermore, it is worth discussing the scope and the limitations of our
study. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to validate
through computational experiments a recently proposed banking regulatory
framework (Campiglio (2016)) aimed to foster green investments. An agent-
based macroeconomic model environment, where endogenous money created
by the banking system plays a crucial role in determining economic dynam-
ics, has been employed for this purpose. Important simplifying assumptions
that may limit the validity of our results have been made. In particular, we
assume an exogenously given technological progress that grows the energy ef-
ficiency of capital goods. This assumption has been quite common among the
seminal contributions in climate change economics, see e.g. Nordhaus (1994);
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000); Stern (2009), which have been mostly focused
on computable general equilibrium models with exogenous technology. More
recently, Acemoglu et al. (2012, 2016), building on pioneering work on the in-
teraction between endogenous innovation and environmental policies, see e.g.
van der Zwaan et al. (2002); Popp (2004), introduce a comprehensive growth
model with environmental constraints characterized by endogenous and di-
rected technical change, showing among other things that models character-
ized by exogenously-given technological progress overstate the economic costs
of environmental regulation. The overestimation of environmental policy costs,
which in our setting can be identified as the observed long-run growth gap in
the case of strict bank capital regulation for mortgage lending, may in princi-
ple occur also in our model, where technological progress is exogenously given.
However, it is worth remarking that the Acemoglu et al’ model is very different
with respect to the model discussed in this paper, both in term of modelling
approach (general equilibrium versus out-of-equilibrium dynamics) and pol-
icy instrument (carbon tax and research subsidies versus banking regulation);
therefore, we argue that this problem is not necessarily present in our analy-
sis. Furthermore, we point out that while the energy efficiency of up-to-date
capital goods is exogenously given, the average energy efficiency of each con-
sumption goods producer is path dependent and endogenously determined by
its investment choices, therefore our model construction takes into account at
the level of the single firm the path dependency of technological endowment,
as in the Acemoglu et al’ model. In any case, future model developments will
address the issue of endogenous technological change.
Finally, while the policies investigated by Acemoglu et al. can be considered
as market-based policies, i.e. characterized by monetary incentives and price
signals, the bank capital adequacy ratio policy employed in our experiments
can be classified among the command-and-control policies, i.e. based on the
setting of quotas and quantity thresholds. Many studies have compared the
effects of market-based and command-and-control policies, see e.g. Hepburn
(2006); Goulder and Parry (2008) for extensive comparisons. Recently, Lam-
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perti et al. (2015) building of the model by Acemoglu et al. (2012) showed
that command-and-control interventions guarantee policy effectiveness irre-
spectively of the timing of their intervention, differently from market-based
ones which instead are characterized by bounded window of opportunity.
Our future research will surely investigate the effectiveness of a carbon tax
in fostering capital goods investments by firms to raise their average energy
efficiency and will compare the results with the command-and-control policy
adopted in this study.
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Fig. 2: The four panels represent aggregate loans (a), aggregate capital stock
(b), average energy intensity (c) and aggregate investments (d), respectively.
The boxplots report for each value of αM considered the time averages from
year 2 to year 6 for any of the 50 seeds (simulations). As for energy intensity
and capital stock, we report the value at year 6 instead of the time average
along the five years period.
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Fig. 3: The three panels represent aggregate mortgages (a), average housing
price (b), and the number of average fire sales (c), respectively. The boxplots
report for each value of αM considered the time averages from year 2 to year
6 for any of the 50 seeds (simulations).
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Fig. 4: The four panels represent total credit (loans + mortgages) (a), the
unemployment rate (b), the real GDP growth rate (c) and the real consump-
tion growth rate (d), respectively. The boxplots report for each value of αM
considered the time averages from year 2 to year 6 for any of the 50 seeds
(simulations).
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Fig. 5: The four panels represent consumption goods price level (a), capital
goods price level (b), nominal wage level (c) and central bank interest rate
(d), respectively. The boxplots report for each value of αM considered the
time averages from year 2 to year 6 for any of the 50 seeds (simulations).
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 29







































































































Fig. 6: The four panels represent the employment rate in the consumption
goods sector (a), the employment rate in the capital goods sector (b), the real
wage level (c) and the aggregate energy consumption (d), respectively. The
boxplots report for each value of αM considered the time averages from year
2 to year 6 for any of the 50 seeds (simulations).
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Fig. 7: The four panels represent aggregate loans (a), aggregate capital stock
(b), average energy intensity (c) and aggregate investments (d), respectively.
The boxplots report for each value of αM considered the time averages from
year 7 to year 16 for any of the 50 seeds (simulations). As for energy intensity
and capital stock, we report the value at year 16 instead of the time average
along the ten years period.
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Fig. 8: The three panels represent aggregate aggregate mortgages (a), average
housing price (b), and the number of average fire sales (c), respectively. The
boxplots report for each value of αM considered the time averages from year
7 to year 16 for any of the 50 seeds (simulations).
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Fig. 9: The four panels represent total credit (loans + mortgages) (a), the
unemployment rate (b), the real GDP growth rate (c) and the real consump-
tion growth rate (d), respectively. The boxplots report for each value of αM
considered the time averages from year 7 to year 16 for any of the 50 seeds
(simulations).
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Fig. 10: The four panels represent consumption goods price level (a), capital
goods price level (b), nominal wage level (c) and central bank interest rate
(d), respectively. The boxplots report for each value of αM considered the
time averages from year 7 to year 16 for any of the 50 seeds (simulations).
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Fig. 11: The four panels represent the employment rate in the consumption
goods sector (a), the employment rate in the capital goods sector (b), the real
wage level (c) and the aggregate energy consumption (d), respectively. The
boxplots report for each value of αM considered the time averages from year
7 to year 16 for any of the 50 seeds (simulations).
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Fig. 12: The six panels represent the aggregate loans (a), the aggregate capital
stock (b), the average energy intensity (c) , the consumption goods price level
(d), the employment rate in the consumption goods sector (e), the employment
rate in the capital goods sector (f), respectively. The boxplots report for each
value of αM considered the time averages from year 2 to year 6 for any of the 25
seeds (simulations). The black boxplots represent the case of decreasing fossil-
fuel price (ξo = −0.5%), the green boxplots represent the case of constant
fossil-fuel price (ξo = 0.0%) and the blue boxplots the case of increasing fossil-
fuel price ((ξo = 0.5%)), considered in the previous figures. The diamond
marker represent the mean in the black case, the circle marker in the green
case and the triangle in the blue case.
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Fig. 13: The six panels represent the aggregate loans (a), the aggregate capital
stock (b), the average energy intensity (c) , the consumption goods price level
(d), total credit (loans + mortgages) (e), the unemployment rate (f), respec-
tively. The boxplots report for each value of αM considered the time averages
from year 7 to year 16 for any of the 25 seeds (simulations). The black box-
plots represent the case of decreasing fossil-fuel price (ξo = −0.5%), the green
boxplots represent the case of constant fossil-fuel price (ξo = 0.0%) and the
blue boxplots the case of increasing fossil-fuel price (ξo = 0.5%). The diamond
marker represent the mean in the black case, the circle marker in the green
case and the triangle in the blue case.
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Appendix
A1 - The housing market
The housing market is active every first day of the month. Households play
the role of buyers and sellers in the market and can sell or buy one housing
unit at a time; housing units are homogeneous. The market is characterized
by decentralized exchange and posted prices set by sellers.
Households decision making about house purchase and sale is mainly subject
to random behaviour in order to give more relevance to the credit implications
and their impact on the economy as a whole, rather than on the behavioural
aspects of the housing market. In particular, the parameter Φ sets the prob-
ability for each household to be active in the housing market the first day
of each month, unless in the case the household is financially distressed, i.e.
she/he is facing mortgage payments (interests + principal) higher than a given
fraction θfs of her/his income (labor + capital), where both mortgage pay-
ments and income refer to the last quarter. If randomly selected to be active,
the household can assume the role of buyer or seller with equal likelihood.
On the contrary, if financially distressed, say fire sale case, we stipulate that
the household enters the market to sell one housing unit at a discounted price
with respect to the last average market price, so to increase the likelihood that
a transaction takes place, in order to reduce the mortgage burden as well as
the debt service. Furthermore, in the case the ratio between quarterly mort-
gage payments and quarterly income is higher than the threshold θd, where
θd > θfs, then the household defaults on her/his mortgages, which are par-
tially written-off with a consequent loss on the balance sheet of the lending
bank.
If a household is randomly selected to enter the housing market with a seller
role, then she/he posts one of her/his housing units for sale at higher price
than the previous month average market price. In particular, the selling price
is higher by a percentage value which is a random draw uniformly distributed
between 0 and ψup. This model feature can be justified based on the assump-
tion that households randomly selected for the seller role do not have any
particular necessity to liquidate their housing units. Therefore, we make the
reasonable assumption that they are considering the sale of a housing unit
only if they can realize a small random gain with respect to the latest aver-
age housing market price. Conversely, if a household enters the market with
a seller role because financially distressed (fire sale case), then to facilitate
liquidation, we assume she/he posts one of her/his housing unit for sale at
a lower price than the previous average market price by a percentage value
which is a random draw uniformly distributed between 0 and ψdown.
Households that have been randomly selected as buyers are randomly queued
and in turn select to purchase the cheapest available housing unit. A trans-
action takes place at the posted sale price if the household is able to get a
mortgage from a bank to cover the entire value of the house. Therefore, for
the sake of simplicity, we assume that all granted mortgages are characterized
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Table 1: Housing and energy sectors parameters values used in the simulations
Symbol Parameter Value
Φ probability for a household to be active in the housing market 0.5
θfs fire sale threshold as a fraction of households income 0.6
θd mortgage default/write-off threshold as a fraction of households income 0.7
ψup maximum percentage increase of sale price offer 2.5 %
ψdown maximum percentage decrease of sale price offer (fire sale case) 5 %
DSTI debt service-to-income ratio 0.5
ξO monthly growth rate of fossil fuel price 0.5, 0.0, -0.5 %
µE energy price mark-up on fossil fuel price 100%
ξK monthly exponential de-growth rate of capital goods energy intensity 0.2 %
by a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio equal to 1, therefore households do not use
their liquidity when buying a housing unit but just money borrowed from a
bank. This modelling feature has been chosen in order to avoid a direct and si-
multaneous interactions of the housing market purchasing behaviour with the
saving and investing decision in the financial market. In the case a transaction
takes place, the selling agent repays back to the bank the mortgage associated
to the sold housing unit. The housing market session closes when all buyers
had their turn or there are no more houses for sale. A new housing price is
then computed as the average of realized transaction prices.
Banks can provide variable-rate mortgages to households; the annualized
mortgage rate is determined on a monthly basis as a mark-up on the rate set by
the central bank. Households are due to reimburse the mortgage over a period
of 30 years through monthly mortgage payments which include both the inter-
ests and the principal instalment. Principal instalments for each mortgage are
constant over the repaying period and are computed as a ratio between the ini-
tial mortgage amount and 360, i.e. the mortgage duration in months. Monthly
interest payments are determined by the outstanding mortgage principal and
the annualized mortgage rate divided by 12, i.e., the number of months in a
year. Banks, whenever they receive a mortgage request by a household, assess
her/his capability to afford mortgage repayments by comparing household’s
net income (both labor and capital) earned in the last quarter with household’s
expected quarterly mortgage payments, including both old outstanding mort-
gages and the new requested mortgage. Banks grant the requested mortgage
provided that the capital requirement rule is fulfilled and the ratio between
expected quarterly mortgage payments of the household and her/his latest net
quarterly income is lower or equal than a pre-determined threshold, which is
called debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratio.
A2 - Stocks and flows accounting
This section provides a compact description of the model according to the
“stock-flow consistent” approach along the lines introduced by Godley and
Lavoie (2012). This approach allows to check the consistency between stocks
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and flows in the model, both at the level of the single agent and at the ag-
gregate one, in line also with post-Keynesian stock-flow-consistent modelling
approach, see also Caverzasi and Godin (2015).
A detailed description of the behavioral rules characterizing each agent is
reported in Teglio et al. (2017), whereas the details of the housing market
mechanism are illustrated in Ozel et al. (2016).
Here, we present three matrices that show:
– Agent class balance sheets
– Sectorial balance sheet
– Stock and monetary flows among sectors.
In particular, Table 2 reports the balance sheets of each agent class that
populates the Eurace economy. Table 3 shows all assets and liabilities for each
sector (here a sector is the aggregate set of agents belonging to the same
class). Finally, Table 4, called transaction flow matrix, shows all the stock and
monetary flows among sectors.
A3 - Agent class balance sheets
The balance sheets of any class of agents populating the Eurace economy is
shown in Table 2. Each agent is characterized by liquidityM in the assets side
and by equity E in the liabilities side. Households are also characterized by a
portfolio of stock shares and government bonds and by housing units in the
assets side and by mortgages in the liabilities side. Capital goods and inven-
tories, in the assets side, and debt, in the liabilities side, characterize also the
consumption goods producer class. The assets side of the bank agent is also
defined by loans and mortgages whereas the liabilities side by deposits and
debt. Bonds are also presents in the liabilities side of the government. Finally,
the Central Bank is also characterized by loans and government bonds in the
assets side and deposits and fiat money in the liabilities side.
A4 - Sectorial Balance sheets
Table 3 shows, in a compact way, the relation among sectors. In details, a plus
(minus) sign corresponds to agents’ assets (liabilities) and each column can be
read as the aggregated balance sheet of a specific agent. Rows show liabilities
and the corresponding claims (assets) among sectors, thus generally adding up
to zero. Exceptions are capital and inventories, accumulated by CGPs, housing
units belonging to households and households’ equity shares, which are issued
by CGPs, KGP, power producer and banks and do not add up to zero because
of the difference between market price and book value.
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Table 2: Agent class balance sheets
Agent class Assets Liabilities
Household Liquidity: Mh Mortgages: Uh
abbrev.: HH Stock portfolio: Equity: Eh




Gov Bonds: nh,G pG
Housing units: Xh
Consumption Goods Producer Liquidity: Mf Debt: Df =
∑
b ℓf,b
abbrev.: CGP Capital goods: Kf Equity: Ef
index : f = 1, . . . , NFirm Inventories: If
Capital Goods Producer Liquidity: MK Equity: EK
abbrev.: KGP
Power Producer Liquidity: MPP Equity: EPP
abbrev.: PP
Bank Liquidity: Mb Deposits :





index : b = 1, . . . , NBank Loans: Lb =
∑
f Df




h Ub,h Equity: Eb
Government Liquidity: MG
Outstanding government bonds value :
DG = nG pG
abbrev.: G Equity: EG
Central Bank Liquidity: MCB Outstanding fiat money: FiatCB
abbrev.: CB
Loans to banks: LCB =∑
bDCB,b
Deposits:




Table 2. Balance sheets of any class of agents populating the Eurace economy. Bal-
ance sheet entries in the table have a subscript character, that is the index of the agent
to which the variable refers. In some cases, we can find two subscript characters, where
the second one refers to the index of the agents representing the balance sheets counter-
parts. For instance, Df refers to the total loans of firm f , i.e. a liability, and Lb refers
to the total loans of bank b, i.e. an asset. ℓf,b (or ℓb,f ) refer to the loans issued by




f Df represents a balance sheet identity, that
is verified along the entire simulation. nEh,x represent the number of outstanding equity
shares of agents x held by households h. The market price of the equity shares is given
by pEx . The stock portfolio’s value of household h is then computed as:
∑
x nEh,xpEx .
Government bonds’ number and market price are given by nG and pG, respectively.
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Finally, it is worth noting that in table 3, the difference between fiat money
(on the liability side) and central bank liquidity (on the asset side) is always
constant (and equal to the initial central bank liquidity MCB,0. Fiat money is
the money created by the central bank to provide loans to commercial banks,
when they are in liquidity shortage, or to buy government bonds in the sec-
ondary market, through quantitative easing operations. Households, that sell
government bonds to the central bank, deposit the sale proceeds at their own
banks, while the money lend to banks by the central bank is lent to households
of firms, then in turn deposited again in the banking sector. Therefore, in both
cases, the liquidity of the banking sector is increased by an amount equal to the
new Fiat money created and this additional liquidity is deposited by banks at
the central bank, then increasing central bank liquidity by an amount always
equal to the Fiat money originally created. It is worth noting however that the
money supply in the economy can variate independently from the fiat money
created by the central bank, because it endogenously raises every time a bank
grants a new loan or mortgage and it decreases when the loan or mortgage is
paid back.
A5 - Stock and monetary flows among sectors
All the stock and monetary flows among agents are described in the transaction
flow matrix (table 4), where the current account describes the flows of revenues
(plus sign) and payments (minus sign) that agents get and make. Rows show
the monetary flows among agents. The result of agents’ transactions is the net
cash flow.
The capital account section of Table 4 describes the balance sheet changes
related to each sector.
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